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Abstract The study examined the relationship between
epistemic motivation, which is the need for closure (NFC),
and positive attitudes towards a negatively stereotyped
outgroup (i.e., Gypsies). Although extensive research has
revealed that NFC is related to derogatory behavioural ten-
dencies and negative emotions towards stereotyped groups,
it is proposed that NFC may also be linked to positive
attitudes towards outgroups. It is predicted, however, that
this would be true only when NFC is accompanied by a low
ability to achieve closure (AAC). It is argued that low AAC
impairs the construction of schema and their effective
application. Therefore, NFC in individuals with low AAC
may lead them to correct their initial tendency to use ste-
reotypes and, as a consequence, to evaluate a negatively
stereotyped outgroup in a positive way. In this research, low
AAC was assessed by a scale (Study 1) and experimentally
induced (Study 2). In both studies, we measured positive
attitudes towards Gypsies. The results of the studies sup-
ported our prediction that NFC is positively related to
positive attitudes towards Gypsies when AAC is low.
Keywords Need for closure  Ability to achieve closure 
Stereotyping  Attitudes towards outgroup
Introduction
In recent years, the motivated social cognition perspective
has tried to explain people’s beliefs and attitudes towards
different groups. In particular, in his work on lay
epistemics, Kruglanski (1989) has argued that stereotyping
and prejudice stem from particular motivational needs,
rather than being merely a cognitive deficit. An important
concept in this approach is the need for closure (NFC),
which refers to the individual’s desire for firm answers and
their aversion to ambiguity (Kruglanski 1989). As such, the
NFC has been described as the tendency to reduce the
feeling of discomfort experienced in the face of cognitive
uncertainty, through the quick formulation and validation
of a hypothesis (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). It is well
documented that cognitive processes that are used by
individuals with high NFC to reduce uncertainty are cate-
gory-based, non-systematic, and heuristic (for a review see,
Kruglanski et al. 2009). In contrast, individuals with a low
NFC prefer to reduce uncertainty by using piecemeal or
individuation processes. This latter preference is mani-
fested in vigilant behaviour that is based on a systematic
and effortful search, evaluation, and unbiased assimilation
of relevant information (Bar-Tal et al. 1997; Driscoll et al.
1991; Kruglanski et al. 2009).
Need for closure and attitudes towards outgroups
The NFC has been found to affect a broad range of social
cognitive processes, including group processes and inter-
group attitudes. Many studies have demonstrated that
because the NFC fosters a desire for firm knowledge, and
that such knowledge is grounded in the shared reality of
one’s group, NFC also fosters a greater affinity for one’s
ingroup than for outgroups (e.g., Golec and Federico 2004;
Kruglanski et al. 2002; Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Shah
et al. 1998). In addition, people with a higher NFC have
been found to be more motivated to rely on group con-
sensus to guide their judgments, compared to people with a
lower NFC (Kruglanski et al. 2006). Thus, when the
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socially shared stereotype of the outgroup was strongly
negative, high NFC individuals tended to develop more
negative attitudes towards the outgroup than did low NFC
individuals. It is also worth mentioning that various studies
of NFC have focused on its influence on authoritarianism,
essentialism, political conservatism, and prejudice (e.g.,
Roets and Van Hiel 2011; Van Hiel et al. 2004).
Need for closure and ability to achieve closure
as predictors of attitudes towards outgroups
Recent studies however have provided evidence that the
main effects of NFC on the aforementioned variables may
be substantially qualified by an interaction with the ability
to achieve closure (AAC; Bar-Tal and Guinote 2002; Bar-
Tal et al. 1997, 1999; Kossowska and Bar-Tal 2013a; Otten
and Bar-Tal 2002). The level of AAC is defined as the
extent to which individuals expect to be able to use cog-
nitive schema (e.g., stereotypes) effectively to form a
judgment. Thus, in a situation of high AAC, the NFC may
increase the use of heuristic processing or stereotyping.
However, in a situation of low AAC, the NFC may not be
related to construct and apply schema effectively, thus may
lead to systematic or individuating processing. Indeed,
Kossowska and Bar-Tal (2013a) demonstrated that in high-
AAC individuals, NFC is directly related to stereotypical
thinking and negative attitudes toward the outgroup, but in
low-AAC individuals, NFC is inversely related to stereo-
typical thinking and negative attitudes toward the outgroup.
In the present study, we have focused on positive atti-
tudes towards outgroups, which have been largely neglec-
ted in previous studies. We believe that although it is
critical to understand and reduce negative attitudes, it is
also critical to understand and promote positive attitudes
(see Pittinsky 2009; Pittinsky et al. 2011a, b). There is
some evidence that positive and negative attitudes should
be treated as separate dimensions (e.g., Cacioppo and
Berntson 1994; Pittinsky et al. 2011b) because they are
nonreciprocally activated. That is, a change in a negative
attitude does not necessarily coincide with an equivalently
countervailing change in the corresponding positive atti-
tude (Cacioppo et al. 1999). These functionally separate
positive and negative attitude–behaviour links can occur
automatically (Chen and Bargh 1999) and they are evident
in the different neurological systems involved in the
assessment of a stimulus as friendly or hostile (LeDoux
1995). Since positive attitudes may change at different
times and rates than negative attitudes, the current level of
a positive attitude cannot be inferred from the reverse of a
score on a measure of a current negative attitude (Cacioppo
and Berntson 1994; Cacioppo et al. 1997, 1999).
Taking these findings into account, in this paper we have
focused on the degree to which the NFC influences positive
attitudes towards an outgroup. Although previous research
suggested that NFC is related to negative attitudes towards
outgroups, we propose that this may be true only among
high AAC people. Among low AAC people, we hypothe-
sized that NFC is positively associated with positive atti-
tudes towards outgroups. We explain this assumption in
detail below.
When NFC is related to positive attitudes toward
negatively stereotyped outgroups
Previous research revealed that in low-AAC individuals,
NFC is related to the low use of heuristic processing styles
(Bar-Tal et al. 1997; Kossowska and Bar-Tal 2013a). It is
also suggested that this low-level use of heuristic pro-
cessing may not be a manifestation of a controlled and
wilful cognitive process that is aimed at reaching a valid
conclusion (as vigilance is), but rather, that it may be a
manifestation of being helpless to construct a schema and
apply it effectively (see also Guinote 2007; Sedek and
Kofta 1990). In other words, if individuals are unable to
construct and apply negative stereotypes, they may tend to
alter their initial tendency to use stereotypes and, as a
result, they may use more systematic processing style, i.e.,
they may be less sensitive to information relevancy and
attend to and examine of more information. Thus, in their
evaluation of a negatively stereotyped outgroup, for low
AAC people, NFC would be related to more awareness of
positive information about the stereotyped group and
develop more positive or balanced perception of the
outgroup.
It is worth emphasising that we did not make any pre-
dictions about the relationship between NFC and positive
attitudes towards outgroup among high AAC individuals.
We expected that in high AAC individuals, NFC is related
to the effective use of schematic knowledge, thus it would
lead to a negative evaluation of members of negatively
perceived groups. Thus, as some studies have demon-
strated, the effect of NFC among high AAC individuals
applies to negative stereotypes, and negative, but not
positive, attitudes (see: Bar-Tal et al. 1997; Kossowska and
Bar-Tal 2013a; Otten and Bar-Tal 2002).
Overview of the study
In both studies, we assessed the levels of NFC as well as
positive attitudes towards the target group. On the basis of
previous studies (e.g., Bukowski and Winiewski 2011;
Strzeszewski 2003), Gypsies were chosen as a group
towards which Poles hold negative stereotypes and are
prejudiced against. In Study 1 we measured AAC as an
individual characteristic. In Study 2 we used informational
helplessness training to operationalize low AAC. Sedek
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and Kofta (1990) demonstrated that informational help-
lessness decreases the effective use of schemata. Thus, we
expected that a strong experience of informational help-
lessness (i.e., repeated failure on a task that requires cog-
nitive structuring) would reduce AAC. We hypothesized
that NFC may lead to positive attitudes to outgroups among
low AAC people. This hypothesis is based on the
assumption that NFC is linked to the motivation to use
stereotypical thinking and develop negative attitudes
towards outgroups among high AAC people. However, low
AAC leads to an inability to finish the epistemic process
sufficiently to avoid inconsistent information, to form and
use unequivocal, one-sided, unambiguous categorisations
or to apply the schema efficiently. Thus, under low AAC,
NFC leads to an alteration of the initial tendency to use
schematic knowledge, and to process information that is
inconsistent with the previous knowledge (i.e., positive).
As a consequence, NFC leads to the development of
positive attitudes toward the negatively stereotyped
outgroups.
Study 1
In Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that, depending on their
NFC, the degree to which the respondents develop positive
attitudes towards the target group would be differentially
affected by their AAC. Our premise was that among indi-
viduals with low AAC, NFC is related to avoidance of
negative evaluations and the tendency to foster positive
evaluations. To make our argument about the separate
mechanisms of positive and negative attitudes stronger, we
also measured negative stereotypes that participants used to
create their impressions of outgroup members. We
hypothesised that NFC is related to negative stereotype
usage among high (but not low) AAC individuals.
Method
Participants
The study was conducted online and links to the survey1 were
distributed through popular Polish portals to recruit partici-
pants. Five hundred and nineteen internet users (262 men,
257 women) completed all the measures in the survey. The
age of the participants ranged from 17 to 27 years of age
(M = 21.42, SD = 1.65). Of the respondents, 27.0 % had
completed higher education, 65.2 % had completed sec-
ondary education, and 17.8 % left school before completing
secondary education. The survey respondents received 30
PLN (approximately 5 Euro) for participating in the survey.
Materials and procedure
Participants completed a short version of the NFC Scale
(Kossowska et al. 2012) at the beginning of the session. We
used four of the five subscales of the NFC scale (Webster
and Kruglanski 1994): preference for order and structure in
the environment, predictability of future contexts, affective
discomfort occasioned by ambiguity, and closed-minded-
ness. We excluded the decisiveness subscale because it is
has been found to measure ability rather than motivation
(Bar-Tal and Kossowska 2010; Roets and Van Hiel 2007).
Respondents rated 12 items on a six-point scale (from
1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely agree). The
mean score for all items was calculated (Cronbach’s
a = .84, M = 3.9, SD = 0.72). A higher mean score
indicated a higher NFC.
The ability to reach closure was measured by a six-point
scale (from 1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely
agree) that consisted of nine items representing high and
low AAC. An example of an item demonstrating high
ability is: ‘‘I do not bother with simple matters, I usually
know what to do at once’’. An example of an item dem-
onstrating low ability is: ‘‘I tend to postpone important
decisions to the last moment, and even then I have prob-
lems making them’’. The construction and validation of the
scale is described in Bar-Tal and Kossowska (2010). In the
present study, the overall mean score of all items was
calculated (Cronbach’s a = .79, M = 3.60, SD = 0.80). A
higher score on the scale implied a higher AAC.
To measure positive attitudes towards Gypsies, partici-
pants completed a 10-item scale that was based on the Al-
lophilia Scale by Pittinsky et al. (2011a). We used items
measuring positive affective evaluations of outgroup mem-
bers (‘‘In general, I have positive attitudes about Gypsies’’;
‘‘I feel positively towards Gypsies’’), feelings of ease with
outgroup members (‘‘I find it easy to talk to Gypsies’’;
‘‘There is no awkwardness for me when I’m around Gyp-
sies’’), tendency to seek opportunities to affiliate and interact
with outgroup members (‘‘I am truly interested in under-
standing the points of view of Gypsies’’; ‘‘I am motivated to
get to know Gypsies’’), and having emotionally heightened
positive attitudes about outgroup members (‘‘I admire the
Gypsy community members who live here under difficult
circumstances’’; ‘‘I am impressed by Gypsies’’; ‘‘I feel
inspired by Gypsies’’; ‘‘I am enthusiastic about Gypsies’’).
Participants expressed agreement on a six-point scale (from
1 = completely do not agree to 6 = completely agree). We
calculated scores for positive attitudes towards outgroup
members (M = 3.50; SD = 0.67). The reliability of the
scale achieved an acceptable level of internal consistency
(Cronbach’s a = .79). We also used three items proposed
by Craig and Richeson (2012) to measure the participants’
perceived closeness to Gypsies. Respondents were asked to1 The survey was built using SurveyMonkey.
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indicate how close they felt their ideas, interests, and feel-
ings were to those of Gypsies on a nine-point scale (1 = not
close at all to 9 = very close) (Cronbach’s a = .90). Higher
scores indicate greater perceived closeness to the group
(M = 5.61; SD = 1.43).
In addition, we used a list of 13 stereotypical charac-
teristics,2 which was tested in a previous study by Kofta
and Narkiewicz-Jodko (2003) that asked participants to
assess to what extent they agreed that typical Gypsies had
these characteristics (Cronbach’s a = .77; M = 5.20;
SD = 0.59). We calculated the negative stereotype index
from these assessments.
Results
Gender did not significantly predict any outcomes in the
study and, therefore, it was excluded from the analyses.
NFC was correlated with the stereotype index (r = .25,
p = .01) and perceived closeness (r = -.14, p = .01), but
not with positive attitudes towards Gypsies (r = .03,
p = .49) or AAC (r = -.01, p = .89). AAC was not sig-
nificantly correlated with any of the dependent measures.
To examine the moderating effect of AAC, two-step
hierarchical regression analyses were performed on the
dependent measures. NFC and AAC were centred and
entered into the first regression model. The interaction term
(NFC 9 AAC) was added in the second model. The results
of the analyses revealed a significant interaction between
NFC and AAC that predicted the stereotype index
(R2 = .03; F(1,515) = 6.85; p = .01) and perceived
closeness towards Gypsies (R2 = .04; F(1,515) = 9.08;
p = .01). The interaction of NFC and AAC approached
statistical significance for positive attitudes towards Gyp-
sies (R2 = .03; F(1,515) = 3.61; p = .06; see Table 1).
To illustrate the interactions, regression lines for depen-
dent variables as a function of NFC were calculated sepa-
rately for high and low AAC at 1 SD below and above the
mean (representing the top and bottom percentiles; Cohen
and Cohen 1983; Holmbeck 1997). Simple slope analysis
indicated a positive association between NFC and the ste-
reotype index for high-AAC participants (b = 0.14;
t(519) = 3.78; p = .01), and a negative but non-significant
association for low-AAC participants (b = -0.02,
t(519) = 0.43, p = .66). There was also a positive associa-
tion between NFC and positive attitudes for low-AAC par-
ticipants (b = 0.26; t(519) = 3.21; p = .01) and a non-
significant association for high-AAC participants (b = 0.01;
t(519) = 0.14; p = .89). Similarly, the slope of NFC on
perceived closeness for low-AAC respondents was positive
and significant (b = 0.42, t(519) = 5.87, p = .01), but this
slope was non-significant for high-AAC respondents
(b = 0.02, t(519) = 0.03, p = .77). The interaction patterns
are displayed in Figs. 1, 2 and 3.
Discussion
These results demonstrated that the relationship between
positive attitudes and NFC was influenced by AAC, when
Table 1 Regression
coefficients (Study 1)
Dependent variables Unstandardised coefficients Standardised coefficients t Sig. Adj. R2
B SE Beta
Perceived closeness
(Constant) 5.61 0.06 90.73 .01 .03
NFC -0.22 0.06 -0.15 3.56 .01
AAC 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 .96
NFC 9 AAC -0.20 0.06 -0.13 3.01 .01
Positive attitudes towards Gypsies
(Constant) 3.62 0.03 108.51 .01 .03
NFC -0.10 0.03 -0.13 3.01 .01
AAC 0.06 0.03 0.07 1.69 .91
NFC 9 AAC -0.07 0.04 -0.08 1.90 .06
Stereotype index
(Constant) 5.02 0.02 199.83 .01 .04
NFC 0.07 0.02 0.12 2.67 .01
AAC 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 .97
NFC 9 AAC 0.07 0.03 0.11 2.50 .01
2 The stereotypical characteristics used in the study: unreliable,
educated, lazy, friendly, competent, moral, dishonest, family man,
orderly, neat, intrusive, insolent, filthy. Positive characteristics were
reversed before calculation the index of negative stereotype.
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it was measured as an individual characteristic. Specifi-
cally, we found that a positive relationship between posi-
tive attitudes and NFC existed only when participants had a
low level of AAC. It was hypothesised that among par-
ticipants with a low AAC, NFC would reduce confidence in
schematic beliefs and alter their initial opinions, which in
turn, would increase their awareness of positive informa-
tion about the stereotyped group, yielding a more balanced
perception. As a result, the higher the NFC, the less the
participants would use one-sided and unequivocal
descriptions of Gypsies. These arguments appeared even
stronger when we examined the interaction of NFC and
AAC on stereotypes. As we expected, for high AAC, NFC
associated with having negative stereotypes of Gypsies, but
for low AAC, there was no association between NFC and
stereotyping. Low AAC may have prevented participants
with increased NFC from constructing schema and apply-
ing them effectively, and thus, these participants may
perceive outgroups ambiguously, not in a schematic and
negative way.
Study 2
In Study 2, we investigated positive attitudes towards
Gypsies as in Study 1, but we experimentally decreased
participants’ AAC. Although past research has mainly
focused on the AAC as dispositional measure, we propose
that AAC can be influenced by situational factors. Factors
such as situational perceptions of mental resources, posi-
tive mood, or being in a powerless position have been
found to affect individuals’ AAC (Clarkson et al. 2010;
Kossowska and Bar-Tal 2013b; Otten and Bar-Tal 2002).
In the research reported here, we attempted to induce a
sense of uncontrollability by applying a helplessness
training procedure to reduce AAC. Thus, we hypothesised
that under low AAC, NFC would lead to positive attitudes
towards Gypsies. We did not expect a relationship between




Fifty-four students from one of the universities in Krakow
(40 women and 14 men; Mage = 21.00, SD = 1.43) took
Fig. 1 Regression lines showing the index of stereotype as a function
of NFC, for low and high AAC participants (Study 1)
Fig. 2 Regression lines showing the positive attitudes towards
Gypsies as a function of NFC for low and high AAC participants
(Study 1)
Fig. 3 Regression lines showing the index of perceived closeness
towards Gypsies as a function of NFC for low and high AAC
participants (Study 1)
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part in the study on a voluntarily basis, and they received
credit points for their participation.
Materials and procedure
Participants were asked to take part in a study on impres-
sion formation. They were randomly assigned to one of the
experimental conditions (helplessness and control). They
received booklets containing demographic questions and
the NFC scale, and then they completed the experimental
tasks and a questionnaire measuring attitudes towards
Gypsies. Later, they were debriefed and thanked.
We used the 32 item version of the NFC scale (Webster
and Kruglanski 1994; Polish version: Kossowska 2003),
excluding the decisiveness subscale. The Cronbach’s a was
.85 (M = 3.54; SD = 0.42). The perceived AAC of the
participants was manipulated using a computerised version
of a concept formation task, which was originally developed
as the Informational Helplessness Training procedure
(Sedek and Kofta 1990). This task was used with success by
Otten and Bar-Tal (2002) to manipulate AAC. In the help-
lessness inducing condition (low AAC), participants were
requested to complete six tasks that were, in fact, unsolv-
able. In the control condition, participants were given
solvable tasks. The tasks consisted of six discrimination
problems with eight trials for each problem. Participants had
to identify a critical feature that defined a series of eight
figures. Figures varied in four ways, with each having two
features: (a) size (small or large), (b) shape (triangle or
circle), (c) surface (plain or striped), and (d) capitalisation of
the letter ‘r’ in the middle of a figure (r or R). For each
discrimination problem, the computer programme consecu-
tively presented the eight figures, each of which was label-
led, ‘yes, feature is included’ or ‘no, feature is not included’.
After being exposed to the eight figures, each participant
was given a full list of possible solutions (i.e., the list of
eight figure features). The task was explained and demon-
strated in an example in which the task was solvable. The
actual manipulation began after ensuring that participants
understood the nature of the task.
In the low AAC condition, the eight figures in each
discrimination problem were shown consecutively to par-
ticipants. The participants were not told about the cor-
rectness of their responses under the pretext that they
would be given this information after completing the study.
This procedure has been shown to produce a state of irre-
ducible uncertainty, which can be considered a reliable
predictor of self-reported cognitive difficulties with think-
ing and attention (Kofta and Sedek 1999). In the control
group, participants performed solvable discrimination
tasks. Participants were not informed about their success or
failure after completing the six problems in either of the
two conditions.
Following the task, participants were requested to mark
the target feature and to answer three questions on six-point
scales: (a) How certain are you that you properly guessed
the target feature? (1 = uncertain 6 = I am absolutely
certain), (b) How did the problem solving go? (1 = it was
very easy, 6 = it was very hard), and (c) How confident do
you feel that you can solve a subsequent problem (1 = I
am certain I will not succeed, 6 = I am certain I will
succeed). The mean of the three questions (after recoding
the second question) served as a manipulation check of the
AAC (Cronbach’s a = .89).
To measure positive attitudes towards Gypsies, we used
four items: ‘‘As viewed by society, do Gypsies make your
group members tend to: help, protect, cooperate with, and
include them into the group?’’ This measure was recom-
mended by Cuddy et al. (2008) as a way to elicit cultural
beliefs while minimising social desirability. The scale ran-
ged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). From
these assessments, we calculated a mean score for positive
attitudes towards Gypsies (Cronbach’s a = .72). We deci-
ded to use different measures of positive attitude than those
used in Study 1 because we were interested in being able to
generalize the results to other popular measures of attitude.
In addition, in previous study, the positive behaviors mea-
sure correlates positively and highly with the allophilia and
the closeness scales (see also Pittinsky et al. 2011a).
Moreover, attitude theories posit that the affective, cogni-
tive, and behavioural correlates of evaluation tend to con-
verge (e.g., Frijda 1986; Scherer 1988; Smith and Ellsworth
1985), and that situations and their corresponding cognitive
appraisals elicit discrete patterns of emotions, which, in turn,
trigger specific behavioural responses (e.g., offensive action)
(Frijda et al. 1989; Izard 1991; Izard et al. 1993). Moreover,
we wanted to measure the aspect of attitudes related to
behavioral intentions because they are less spontaneous than
just mere evaluations and require the application of sche-
matic knowledge to a greater extent. Thus, it was reasonable
to expect the similar effect of NFC and AAC not only on the
allophilia and closeness scales (affective component), but
also on the scale measuring behavioural tendencies.
Results
To test whether AAC had been successfully decreased, the
answers to the three questions measuring AAC after each of
the six problem-solving tasks were averaged. Lower average
scores were found among participants in the helpless con-
dition compared to the control group (t(54) = 10.82,
p = .01). The means for the helpless condition and the
control condition, respectively, were: M = 1.96, SD = 0.75
and M = 5.36, SD = 1.19. Thus, we may conclude that our
manipulation effectively induced a sense of inability to
achieve closure.
Motiv Emot (2015) 39:88–98 93
123
As in Study 1, the gender of the participants did not
significantly predict any outcomes, and therefore gender
was excluded from the analyses. NFC was not significantly
correlated with the condition variable or with positive
attitudes towards Gypsies.
To examine the moderating effect of condition, two-step
hierarchical regression analysis was performed on positive
attitudes towards Gypsies. Experimental condition (dummy
coded-1 for control/1 for low AAC) and NFC were entered
into the regression equation in the first step. The interaction
term (NFC 9 condition) was added in the second step.
NFC was centred before the respective cross-products were
computed. We found a significant effect of condition
(R2 = .08; F(1,50) = 4.57; p = .04) that demonstrated
less positive attitudes towards Gypsies among participants
in the helpless condition, in which AAC was experimen-
tally decreased. Most importantly, the results of the ana-
lysis revealed a significant interaction between NFC and
experimental conditions for positive attitudes towards
Gypsies (R2 = .17; F(1,50) = 5.63; p = .02; see Table 2).
To illustrate the pattern of the results, the regression
lines for NFC that predicted the dependent variable were
calculated separately for the low AAC and control condi-
tions. Simple slopes analysis indicated that NFC: had a
significant, positive association with positive attitudes
towards Gypsies for the low AAC participants (b = 1.48;
t(54) = 2.17; p = .04); and, had a non-significant, nega-
tive association with positive attitudes towards Gypsies for
the control group (b = -0.45; t(54) = 1.01; p = .32). See
Fig. 4.
Discussion
In Study 2, we demonstrated that NFC is related to positive
attitudes toward Gypsies among people with a decreased
sense of personal control (i.e., low AAC condition) com-
pared to a control group without a decreased sense of
personal control. It can be argued that in such motivational
settings people cannot effectively construct and apply
dominant cognitive schemas (dispositional or situationally
activated), and instead they develop more non-schematic
knowledge structures (see Kofta et al. 2011). In the case of
our study, the findings contribute to the existing literature
by showing a similar pattern of results in the domain of
attitudes. That is, in people who experience lower levels of
AAC, NFC is linked to positive attitudes towards the out-
group, in contrast to people from a group without personal
control deprivation. This seemingly paradoxical effect of
increased positivity towards negatively evaluated out-
groups reflects the specific role of NFC when one’s expe-
rience of AAC is low. In such cases, the commonly
observed pattern of increased negativity towards outgroups
reverses, because one’s initial confidence in one’s own
knowledge and cognitive abilities is undermined. It seems
that situations that decrease personal control and the per-
ceived ability to obtain certain knowledge, yield less uni-
form evaluations of outgroup. This leads to higher positive
ratings of negatively evaluated outgroup, as we have shown
in this study. It is worth stressing that these results cor-
roborate previous findings (e.g., Kruglanski et al. 2002;
Otten and Bar-Tal 2002).
Table 2 Regression
coefficients (Study 2)
Condition coded -1 control/1—
low AAC
Dependent variables Unstandardised coefficients Standardised coefficients t Sig. Adj. R2
B SE Beta
Positive attitudes towards Gypsies
(Constant) 3.47 0.16 21.15 .01 .09
NFC 0.25 0.20 0.18 1.28 .20
Condition -0.39 0.16 -0.30 2.39 .02
NFC 9 condition 0.47 0.20 0.32 2.37 .02
Fig. 4 Regression lines showing the index of positive attitudes (i.e.,
behavioural tendencies) towards Gypsies as a function of NFC for low
AAC and control group (Study 2)
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Summary and concluding discussion
Our studies demonstrated that for participants with low
AAC, there was a positive relationship between NFC and
positive attitudes towards a negatively stereotyped out-
group. We suggest that in the low AAC condition, NFC
may not have been related to the construction and effective
use of schemas (i.e., negative stereotype of Gypsies in this
research), and this may have led to systematic processing
information that is inconsistent with stereotypes (i.e.,
positive). As a result, the higher the NFC, the less the
participants tended to use one-sided and unequivocal
descriptions of Gypsies, thus making it easier to foster
positive attitudes towards the outgroup. We demonstrated
this effect when using three different measures of positive
attitudes toward Gypsies, which leads us to think that this is
a general phenomenon that is not dependent on the way
that positive attitudes are measured.
It is worth stressing that we did not expect the same
mechanism to influence negative attitudes. Although we
did not investigate this in the current research, we expect
that NFC is related to negative attitudes towards outgroups
among people with high, but not low AAC. Experiencing
high AAC, people might expect that they can easily reduce
uncertainty by applying schematic knowledge, and when
that information is negative (i.e., negative stereotype), they
use it to foster negative attitudes towards outgroups. We
believe that our findings are in line with research that
suggests that positive and negative attitudes should be
treated as separate dimensions (e.g., Cacioppo and Bernt-
son 1994; Pittinsky et al. 2011b).
Moreover, our results corroborate the motivation-cog-
nitive model of information processing presented by Bar-
Tal et al. (1997), which extends the lay epistemic theory
(Kruglanski 1989). One of the implicit assumptions of the
lay epistemic theory is that because the cognitive processes
associated with high NFC are relatively effortless and
automatic, achieving closure is an easy default option,
which is available regardless of an individual’s ability to
carry it through. However, our results provide evidence for
the idea that the construction and application of cognitive
schemas is not relatively automatic and effort-free, and
thus may not always be the most efficient means of
achieving certainty. Specific ability (i.e., AAC) is appar-
ently required for an individual to realise his/her motiva-
tion to achieve certainty by reaching closure. Our findings
suggest that inclusion of the concept of AAC as an inherent
component of the widely accepted theory of lay episte-
mology may elucidate our understanding of the process of
knowledge formation and use.
It is also important to note that this research demon-
strated that AAC could be situationally lowered. The
validity of our manipulation of AAC as a situational
variable was supported by our manipulation checks and it
has been corroborated in studies by Bar-Tal et al. (e.g.,
1999; Bar-Tal and Guinote 2002; Kossowska and Bar-Tal
2013a), who found comparable NFC 9 AAC interaction
effects based on individual-characteristic variables.
Importantly, we demonstrated that a decreased sense of
control might, in fact, decrease reliance on accessible
constructs, regardless of their chronic or temporal acces-
sibility. So far, it has been shown when people have a low
sense of control, they appear to be less inclined to rely on
stereotypes and schematic knowledge to obtain more spe-
cific, individual information from the environment (Kofta
and Narkiewicz-Jodko 2003). In a similar vein, when AAC
is low, people with increased NFC do not rely on easily
accessible schemas, such as stereotypes (Bar-Tal and
Guinote 2002). Similar results have been reported for the
effect of self-anchoring in the minimal group paradigm.
That is, experimentally decreased levels of AAC impeded
the tendency to rely on the self as a heuristic for ingroup
evaluations (Otten and Bar-Tal 2002). Our research shows
that for people with decreased levels of personal control
and perceived AAC, NFC can also lead to the expression of
more positive intergroup attitudes. We believe that this is
an important contribution to research on the malleability of
stereotypes and attitudes, which has shown that many
motivational (e.g., understanding, controlling, self-
enhancement etc.) and cognitive (e.g., focus of attention,
configuration of stimulus cues etc.) factors can change
individual’s perception and evaluation of outgroup mem-
bers (Blair 2002; Fiske 2003; Kunda and Spencer 2003).
Additionally, we would argue that it is important to take
into account the interaction between situationally activated
motives (e.g., uncertainty reduction) and personal predis-
positions (e.g., perceived ability or self-efficacy in dealing
with uncertainty) when analysing conditions that promote
belief or attitude change.
One could, however, argue that AAC (both as manipu-
lated and as measured) could be seen as a proxy for fear of
invalidity, which was defined by Kruglanski (1989) as a
concern with error or the consequences of a decision. This
concern is associated with the continued generation and
evaluation of information relevant to a given decision (see
Kruglanski and Freund 1983). Such an increase in the fear of
invalidity, may be expected to lower the NFC, resulting in
less negative attitudes toward the stereotyped group. More-
over, one might argue that the stereotype attenuating influ-
ence of the AAC is more apparent when NFC is high
because there is greater room for NFC reduction. Though
high NFC and fear of invalidity often co-occur, and thus
may be lumped together (see Kruglanski et al. 1997), pre-
vious research shows that NFC is unrelated to AAC (Bar-Tal
and Kossowska 2010). Also, the results of Study 2, in which
AAC was experimentally decreased, are not consistent with
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this expectation. In fact we found that among low AAC
participants, NFC is positively related to positive attitudes.
Although in light of our study we think it is improbable that
these results are attributable to fear of invalidity, future
research is needed to address this issue in full.
Finally, it is worth mentioning some important limitations
of our studies. Pittinsky et al. (2011b) suggested that positive
and negative attitudes towards outgroups are distinct con-
structs, and that both of them should be measured to
understand behaviours towards those groups. In the current
research, however, we focused on positive attitudes only. As
mentioned above, we did not predict a significant relation-
ship between NFC and positive attitudes for high AAC
individuals, and we did not find such a relationship. Future
research should measure both negative and positive attitudes
at the same time to fully study the NFC 9 AAC interaction
model. We did not expect that NFC would be negatively
related to positive attitudes among high AAC participants: in
Study 1 we measured AAC, and in Study 2 we lowered
AAC. We assumed that NFC is related to perceiving out-
groups as homogeneous (Dijksterhuis et al. 1996). Thus,
members of negatively perceived groups should be evalu-
ated more negatively by people with increased NFC, and
high AAC will increase this relationship. Although the
results indicate that high AAC increased the use of stereo-
types when NFC is higher, there were no significant rela-
tionship between NFC and stereotyping for low AAC
participants. This result may be interpreted to mean that in
low AAC participants, NFC is related to problems with
constructing and applying schemas efficiently.
In future research, therefore, it would be important to
measure negative and positive components at the same time
by using a broader range of attitudinal measures. To further
test our hypotheses, we would need to measure the ambiguity
of people’s outgroup evaluations and the variability of their
outgroup perceptions. Based on the ‘‘ability 9 need’’ model
of knowledge formation, we would expect ambiguity and
variability to increase with NFC in low ability conditions.
Additionally, different groups could be used as the targets of
attitudes; these could be groups that are evaluated in a less
uniformly negative fashion, or even groups who are posi-
tively evaluated, to replicate the decrease in positivity under
lowered perception of ability. Last, but not least, it is
important to take the intergroup perspective into account, and
to consider such variables in the evaluation of outgroups,
e.g., social status. It might be expected that there would be a
stronger increase in positive attitude towards low versus high
status outgroups when one’s perceived ability to achieve
closure is high but the epistemic motivation remains strong.
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